# Game Theory and ML



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# Lecture 5: Adversarial Examples

#### References to read for this course:

- Szegedy, Christian, et al. "Intriguing properties of neural networks." arXiv preprint arXiv:1312.6199 (2013).
- 2. Goodfellow, Ian J., Jonathon Shlens, and Christian Szegedy. "Explaining and harnessing adversarial examples." *arXiv preprint arXiv:1412.6572* (2014)

#### Last Time


Empirical Risk Minimization:

$$\min_{\theta} \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \ell(f_{\theta}(x_i), y_i)$$

So what we have is a classifier that is good on the train set:  $(x_i, y_i)$ 

Question What about what is close to the train and test sets?

### Adversarial Examples in One Picture



## Adversarial Examples in One Picture

$$\|x-x'\| \leq \epsilon$$
Any meaningful norm

- Examples:  $L_2$  or  $L_{\infty}$  norms.
- Beyond that anything that says
   'Two images are close'



#### How to find the Best attack?

$$\max_{x'} \ell(f(x'), y))$$

Such that  $||x - x'|| \le \epsilon$ 

#### Adversarial Examples as an Optimization Problem

$$x' \in \arg\max_{x' \in \mathcal{X}} \ell(f_t(x'), y)$$
, s.t.  $d(x, x') \leq \epsilon$ .

- f : function to attack.
- x:input datapoint.
- x': adversarial example.
- y:true label.
- $\ell$ : loss function.



#### Threat Model

$$x' \in \arg\max_{x' \in \mathcal{X}} \ell(f_t(x'), y)$$
, s.t.  $d(x, x') \leq \epsilon$ .

Threat model:
 What do we assume the attacker has access to.
 (i.e. what is the threat)

#### Ontimization

- White Box threat model: Access to the gradients of f
- Black Box threat model: Access to the values of f
- Practical Black Box (see today's presentation)
- NoBox threat model: (see following lectures)

#### Threat Model

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#### Ontimization

- White Box threat model: Access to the gradients of f
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#### White Box Threat Model

• Idea: Use (projected) gradient ascent to solve this:


$$x' \in \arg\max_{x' \in \mathcal{X}} \ell(f_t(x'), y)$$
, s.t.  $d(x, x') \leq \epsilon$ .

• Idea 2: Use a gradient method that correspond to the geometry of the constraint:


$$||x - x'|| \le \epsilon$$

• Idea 3: do we need more than 1 step?

#### Original attack



### Original attack



1 step of Steepest descent with L<sub>m</sub> constraints.

#### Fancier attacks

- Several steps of steepest descent. [Madry et al, 2017]
- Add momentum [Dong et al 2018]
- When several steps.. Be careful of the constraints:

$$x' \in [0,1]^d$$
 and  $||x - x'|| \le \epsilon$ 

#### Black Box attack

• Idea: query  $\ell$  around x to get an approximation of the gradient.

$$\frac{\ell(f(x)) - \ell(f(x + \delta e_i))}{\delta} \approx [\nabla \ell(f(x))]_i$$

Related to zero-th order optimization (will not be the topic of this course)

• See [Siddhant et al. 2020] for a survey of Black Box Attacks.

#### Defenses

Ideas to be robusts againsts such Adv Attacks:

- 1. Gradient Masking (now)
- 2. Preprocessing of the input
- 3. Adversarial Training (Next Lecture)
- Many more...[Prakash et al. 2018], [Liao et al. 2018], [Schott, Lukas, et al. 2018] (Open research direction) (see <a href="https://www.robust-ml.org/defenses/">https://www.robust-ml.org/defenses/</a>)

#### Useful References:

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- 2. Goodfellow, Ian J., Jonathon Shlens, and Christian Szegedy. "Explaining and harnessing adversarial examples." *arXiv preprint arXiv:1412.6572* (2014)
- https://openai.com/blog/adversarial-example-research/
- 4. Papernot, Nicolas, et al. "Practical black-box attacks against machine learning."

  Proceedings of the 2017 ACM on Asia conference on computer and communications security. 2017. (Presentation on that paper)
- 5. Y. Dong, F. Liao, T. Pang, H. Su, J. Zhu, X. Hu, and J. Li. Boosting adversarial attacks with momentum. In Proceedings of the IEEE conference on computer vision and pattern recognition, 2018.
- A. Madry, A. Makelov, L. Schmidt, D. Tsipras, and A. Vladu. Towards deep learning models resistant to adversarial attacks. Sixth International Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR), 2017

#### Standard things to know

- Change the loss [Carlini, Wagner 2016].
- Targeted adversarial attacks:

$$x' \in \arg\min_{\|x-x'\| \le \epsilon} \ell(f(x'), y')$$

Other label